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Abstract
Two distinct forms of cooperation emerged in response to structural changes in the agricultural 
sector of the Irish economy in the late nineteenth century: the Land League and the Irish Agricultural 
Organisation Society (IAOS). This article argues that the Land League fostered cooperation among 
tenants and agitated for government intervention to reduce rents and transfer landownership from 
landlords to tenants, whereas the IAOS encouraged the imitation of continental forms of cooperative 
agricultural enterprise. This article analyses the relationship between both forms of cooperation and 
finds that the Land League and subsequent Land War did not hinder the adoption of cooperation 
enterprise and were instead complementary to cooperative organization. However, the article argues 
that the IAOS cooperatives were ideologically motivated and misguided and that cooperative enterprises 
introduced offered no institutional advantages compared to incumbent institutions.
    ‘We were told that Irishmen can conspire but cannot combine’.1
Two distinct forms of cooperation emerged in response to structural changes in the agricultural 
sector of the Irish economy in the late nineteenth century: the Land League, founded in 
Castlebar, Co. Mayo in 1879, and the cooperatives associated with the Irish Agricultural 
Organisation Society (IAOS), founded in 1894. These economic and social movements differed 
in their institutional structures and functions. Moreover, their elites represented opposed views 
of constitutional politics. The Land League fostered cooperation among tenants and agitated 
to reduce rents and transfer landownership from landlords to tenants. In contrast, the IAOS 
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encouraged the imitation of continental forms of agricultural cooperative enterprise where 
individual producers cooperated to reduce costs of production and realize economies of scale. 
This article posits the argument that the immediate response to structural changes in the 
agrarian economy was the formation of the Land League, which was intrinsically cooperative. 
A later response to these structural changes was the formation of cooperative enterprises by 
the IAOS. Cooperative enterprises associated with the IAOS were imitations of successful 
cooperative initiatives in Scandinavia and Continental Europe. However, indigenous manifes-
tations of cooperation in Ireland in the guise of the Land League (1879–1882)2 emerged 
contemporaneously to cooperative ventures in Scandinavia (e.g., 1880 in Sweden and 1882 in 
Denmark), and thus preceded attempts to imitate Scandinavian and continental European 
forms of cooperation in Ireland in the 1890s. 
The central question that this article explores is how these different institutional forms of 
cooperation functioned in Ireland and, in particular, whether they competed with or comple-
mented each other. Potentially there was a capacity for complementarity between both forms 
of cooperation. On the one hand, land reform, as agitated for by the Land League, could have 
created greater property rights and given landholders an incentive to participate in cooperative 
enterprises. Cooperative enterprises could have made small landholdings economically viable 
by reducing transaction costs and giving individuals access to economies of scale and scope. On 
the other hand, the pre-existence of alternative institutional forms of cooperation could have 
undermined the adoption of novel cooperative institutions that espoused alternative functions. 
For example, it may have created path-dependencies whereby tenant farmers focused on forms 
of cooperation that lobbied for government intervention and were blinded to other strategies 
such as developing alternative cooperative functions that emphasized productivity increases. 
In a recent study of the determinants of cooperation in Ireland, O’Rourke argued that 
agrarian outrages in the early 1880s, associated with the Land League and corresponding 
Land War, were not conducive to the spread of dairy cooperation outside of Ulster in the 
north of the island. He concluded that the ‘suspicion between Catholics and Protestants, and 
tenants and landlords, spilled over into Nationalist suspicion of the cooperative movement and 
hindered its spread, despite the efforts of the IAOS to remain apolitical’.3 Conversely, Horace 
Plunkett (1854–1932), agricultural reformer and unionist member of parliament (1892–1900) 
and a divisive political figure,4 argued, in Ireland in the new century, that ‘the process of 
[cooperative] organization was also, to some extent, facilitated by the insight the people have 
been given by the Land League into the power of combination, and by the education they had 
received in the conduct of meetings’.5 In this article, these contrasting views are compared. 
It is concluded that the Land League and subsequent land war did not hinder the adoption 
of cooperative enterprises; in fact the Land League can be seen to be complementary to 
cooperative  organization. However, it is also argued that the IAOS was ideologically motivated 
 2 R. V. Comerford, ‘Land League’, in S. J. Connolly 
(ed.), The Oxford companion to Irish History (2007), 
pp. 00–00.
 3 Kevin H. O’Rourke, ‘Culture, conflict and cooper-
ation: Irish dairying before the Great War’, in Economic 
J., 117 (2007), p. 1375.
 4 ODNB, ‘Plunkett, Sir Horace Curzon (1854–1932)’.
 5 Although, he believed people had been too depend-
ent on a central authority: Plunkett, Ireland in the new 
century, pp. 186–7.
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 6 Kevin O’Rourke, ‘Did the Great Irish Famine 
matter?’, in JEcH 51 (1991), pp. 1–22.
 7 Raymond D. Crotty, Irish agricultural production: 
its volume and structure (1966). 
 8 Return of owners of land of one acre and upwards 
in counties, cities and towns in Ireland [C. 1492], 
H.C. 1876, lxxx, 61 and Agricultural Statistics of Ireland 
[C. 1749], H.C. 1877, lxxxv, 529. The existing histori-
ography is somewhat divided on the issue regarding 
landlord-tenant relations and their implications for the 
agricultural sector. The traditional view presented a 
‘heroes and villains’ scenario, with tenants portrayed 
as the protagonists fighting rapacious landlords, e.g. 
Charles Stewart Parnell, ‘The Irish Land Question’ in 
North American Rev. 130 (1880), pp. 388–406. (It has 
been suggested that this article may have been written 
by Parnell’s sister: Paul Bew, Land and the national 
question in Ireland, 1858–82 (1978), p. 82.) Subsequently, 
a series of revisionist interpretations of landlord-tenant 
relations argued that the relationship between land-
lords and tenants was not as malevolent as popularly 
supposed: Crotty, Irish Agricultural production; James 
S. Donnelly Jr, The land and the people of nineteenth-
century Cork: The rural economy and the land question 
(1975); Barbara Lewis Solow, The land question and the 
Irish economy, 1870–1903 (1971); and W. E. Vaughan, 
Landlords and tenants in mid-Victorian Ireland (1994). 
This view has in turn has been followed by a counter-
revision: Theodore Hoppen, Ireland since 1800: conflict 
and conformity (sec. edn, 1999), Michael Turner, After 
the Famine: Irish agriculture, 1850–1914 (1996). More 
recently, however, a consensus has emerged which dis-
cards the notion of predatory landlords: Donnacha 
Seán Lucey, Land, popular politics and agrarian vio-
lence in Ireland: the case of Kerry, 1872–86 (2011), p. 2.
 9 Agricultural Statistics of Ireland; with Detailed 
Report for 1914, H.C. 1916 [Cd. 8266]
and that the cooperatives it introduced offered no institutional advantages compared to those 
that already existed as private enterprises.
The article proceeds as follows. Sections I and II outline the broad trends in the Irish 
agricultural sector from 1850 to 1877. Section III introduces the Land War and Land League 
and presents the argument that the Land League was a cooperative institution. Section IV 
discusses agricultural cooperation in Ireland. Section V returns to the question of whether the 
Land League and the IAOS were competitors or complements. 
I
The Great Irish Famine of the 1840s was the pivotal moment in Irish economic and social 
history.6 It heralded changes in socio-economic relationships and the structure of the Irish 
economy. Arguably, some of these changes were visible in the pre-Famine period,7 but they 
became more pronounced post-Famine. The Famine resulted in an immediate decrease in 
the population of Ireland, the emergence of path-dependent emigration patterns and shifts 
from tillage to pasture. During the 1870s, agricultural conditions in Ireland were gradually 
improving and landlord-tenant relations were in all likelihood not as strained as traditionally 
portrayed. Then, a severe recession upset a delicate equilibrium and instigated structural 
change. Essentially the forms of cooperation under review here can be seen as responses to 
that structural change.
The following section gives a brief outline of developments in Irish agriculture in the period 
from 1850 to 1877. During these years, and for the majority of the period covered in this article, 
Irish land was held by a small number of landlords (there were 32,614 owners of more than one 
acre in 1875–6) who in turn rented or leased their land to tenant farmers (there were 533,151 
occupied landholdings in 1876).8 Land transfers began en masse in 1903 and by 1914 62.6 per 
cent of farmers were owner-occupiers.9
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 10 The highest number of annual evictions taking 
place in 1864 with 36 evictions per 10,000 occupied 
landholdings, the lowest number of annual evictions 
took place in 1869 with seven evictions per 10,000 
occupied landholdings. See Agricultural Statistics of 
Ireland and Return, by provinces and counties (com-
piled from returns made to the Inspector General, Royal 
Irish Constabulary), of cases of evictions which have 
come to the knowledge of the constabulary in each of 
the years from 1849 to 1880, inclusive, H.C. 1881 (185), 
lxxvii, 725.
 11 The interpretation of the eviction figures has been 
nuanced by consideration of the issue of re-admissions. 
See Donnelly, Cork, and Vaughan, Landlords and 
tenants.
 12 Solow, Land question; Donnelly, Cork; and 
Vaughan, Landlords and tenants.
 13 James Donnelly, ‘The Irish agricultural depression 
of 1859–64’, Irish Economic and Social Hist. 3 (1976), 
pp. 33–54.
 14 Liam Kennedy and Peter M. Solar, Irish agricul-
ture: a price history (2007).
 15 Cormac Ó Gráda, A new economic history of 
Ireland (1994), p. 256.
 16 Eviction Statistics; Kennedy and Solar, Irish 
agriculture.
The main demand of the Land League was primarily a reduction in rent and increases 
in security of tenure (a reduction in evictions), with the transfer of landownership from 
landlords to tenants a longer-term goal. Thus, it is important to analyse a number of critical 
issues: tenant security, rent, farm income and its distribution and the overall relationship 
between farm income and rent. However, landlord-tenant relations do not exist in a vacuum 
and so it is also important to explore broader issues in the agricultural structure such as the 
concentration of landownership, distribution of land, land usage and price movements.
A key issue is the security of tenant farmers in the post-Famine period against arbitrary 
evictions. Arguably, tenant farmers were relatively secure on their land provided they honoured 
contractual agreements – namely, they paid their rents. During the period 1850–76 evictions 
and eviction rates per farm were relatively low. There was a trend of decreasing eviction 
rates from peaks during the Famine period. Evictions and the eviction rate rose during the 
agricultural depression of 1859–64, but did not reach the heights of those recorded during 
the Famine. In the period 1860–77 the mean annual eviction rate was 15 per 10,000 occupied 
landholdings,10 suggesting that evictions were not widespread. Admittedly, these figures may 
not give us an exact indication of the number of threats of eviction nor do they take the issue 
of re-admissions into account.11 
Given that rent reduction was a central demand of the Land League, it would be informative 
to have an understanding of rent trends relative to farm income and costs. Unfortunately there 
is no national aggregate (or disaggregate) rental index for Ireland in the nineteenth century; 
however, available evidence from estate records suggests that rent levels were low.12 While there 
are no indicators of agricultural income either, the information contained in agricultural price 
levels acts as a proxy indicating the return to agricultural enterprise. The period 1850 to 1877 
was a period of rising prices, albeit one interrupted by severe downturn in the period 1859–64.13 
Prices for both tillage products and pastoral goods rose considerably in the period, although 
the relative price of tillage to pastoral goods continually shifted in favour of pastoral products.14 
Importantly, it appears as though prices rose faster than rents.15 However, it is unclear what the 
net income of tenant farmers was in this period. Coincidently, there appears to be a negative 
correlation between changes in price levels and changes in eviction rates: when prices went up, 
evictions went down, and vice versa.16 
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 17 There are two historical series that represent 
farms in Ireland – ‘landholdings’ and ‘occupied land-
holdings’. The landholdings series begins earlier and 
shows a larger number of landholdings compared to 
the occupied landholdings series. However, in 1914 it 
was discovered that the landholdings series was flawed 
and overestimated the number of farms. In particular, 
the number of small farms was overestimated and 
the number of large farms underestimated. The terms 
‘landholding’, ‘occupied landholding’, and ‘farm’ have 
been used interchangeably in this article: any statisti-
cal reference using these terms refers to the occupied 
landholdings series.
 18 Return of Owners (1876), 61 and Agricultural Statis-
tics of Ireland [C. 1749], H.C. 1877, lxxxv, 529.
 19 The census definition of ‘urban’ was any town with 
a population over 1500 at a census date, the remainder 
of the population being considered rural.
 20 The proportion of farms, of over one acre and 
under 15 acres, in 1861 and 1871 was 46% and 44%, 
respectively. The agricultural statistics of Ireland ... 1861 
[3156], H.C. 1863, lxix, 547; The agricultural statistics of 
Ireland ... 1871 [C. 762], H.C. 1873, lxix, 375.
 21 In 1871 the percentage ratio of pasture to tillage 
was 184% across all counties, with a standard devia-
tion of 81%: The agricultural statistics of Ireland ... 1871 
[C. 762], H.C. 1873, lxix, 375.
 22 The north was also the most heavily urbanized 
and industrialized region of the island – although this 
was modest by British and European standards – and 
thus had a greater demand for agricultural output.
It is useful to gain an appreciation of how landownership was distributed in post-Famine 
Ireland as it gives an indication of the incidence of landlord-tenant interaction. Landownership 
was concentrated among a small proportion of the population; in 1875–6 the percentage ratio 
of landowners to landholdings17 was 6.1 per cent.18 There was, however, regional variance and 
in the west the percentage ratio was lower, 2.4 per cent; thus there was a lower proportion of 
landowners to tenants and this may have had implications for social and economic interactions 
between landowner and tenant. The overwhelming majority of farmers were tenants and thus 
paid rent. Urban dwellers were also tenants and rent payers.19
In terms of land distribution, the majority of the agricultural community had holdings 
of under 15 acres (c.6 hectares).20 The land itself was heavily grazed, with all areas of the 
island participating in a pastoral economy,21 although some areas with greater intensity than 
others. A notable feature of the Irish agrarian economy was its early specialization in pastoral 
products, which can be seen in the livestock figures in Table 1. The agricultural sector of the 
economy was export orientated and the main export markets were the expanding British cities.
Contemporaries perceived that the north of Ireland – the province of Ulster – was the 
most progressive agricultural area. They explained this in terms of customary rights, which 
conceded security to the tenant.22 A desire to emulate Ulster’s success inspired modest land 
ta bl e  1. Livestock per landholding over one acre in Ireland (32 counties), 1871
Total Mean Standard deviation
Horses 538,095 1.11 0.58
Cattle 3,976,372 7.77 2.66
Milch cows 1,545,662 2.84 1.40
Sheep 4,233,435 8.28 6.13
Pigs 1,621,423 3.20 1.58
Poultry 11,717,183 22.99 5.20
Source: 1871 Census of Ireland.
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 23 Fair rent (a rent lower than the open market rate); 
fixity of tenure (a tenant could not be arbitrarily evicted 
if rents paid – i.e. perpetual lease); free sale (a tenant 
could sell his interest when a tenancy changed hands). 
Kennedy and Solar note that: ‘These extra-legal rights 
varied from estate to estate, but often carried the pre-
sumption that a sitting tenant could expect renewal of 
a lease, once it had expired; that rents would be “fair”, 
meaning essentially lower than the competitive or rack-
rent; and that on vacating a holding he or she had the 
right to sell the value of the unexpired lease to the 
incoming tenant. The last could be valuable, amount-
ing on some farms to ten times or more the annual 
rent paid to the landlord, suggesting that actual rents 
were well below the competitive rent level’. L. Kennedy 
and P. Solar, ‘The rural economy’, in Liam Kennedy 
and Philip Ollerenshaw (eds), Ulster since 1600: politics, 
economy and society (2011), p. 174.
 24 Frank Thompson, The end of Liberal Ulster: land 
agitation and land reform, 1868–1886 (2001).
 25 Paul Bew and Frank Wright, ‘The agrarian opposi-
tion in Ulster politics, 1848–87’, in Samuel Clark and 
James S. Donnelly Jr (eds), Irish Peasants: Violence 
and political unrest, 1780–1914 (1983), p. 193; Cormac 
Ó Gráda, ‘Irish agriculture after the Land War’ in 
Stanley Engerman and Jacob Metzer (eds.), Land rights, 
 ethno-nationality and sovereignty in history (2004), 
p. 134.
 26 Philip Ollerenshaw, ‘Industry, 1820–1914’, in Liam 
Kennedy and Philip Ollerenshaw (eds), An economic 
history of Ulster, 1820–1939 (1985), pp. 76–8.
 27 Agricultural Statistics of Ireland ... 1864 [3456], 
H.C. 1865, lv, 125.
 28 Solow, Land question, p. 121. 
 29 Kevin O’Rourke, ‘The European grain invasion, 
1870–1913’ in JEcH 57 (1997), pp. 775–801.
 30 Kennedy and Solar, Irish agriculture
 31 Turner, After the Famine, p. 108.
 32 L. M. Cullen, An economic history of Ireland since 
1660 (1972), p. 148.
reforms that were implemented throughout the island following the 1870 Land Act, which 
attempted to extend throughout the island the rights associated with the ‘Ulster Custom’ 
and provide compensation for improvements and damage.23 However, recent scholarship has 
challenged the view of Ulster as unique and instead highlights the complexity of the northern 
agricultural sector.24 In addition, scholars have pointed to similar customs found in other 
parts of the island, which did not resolve landlord-tenant problems.25 Moreover, contemporary 
prosperity in the north seems to be related to a flax boom in the 1860s caused by the ‘cotton 
famine’ induced by the American Civil War (1861–5).26 Prices for flax rose in this period, 
and tonnage output also increased. Importantly, flax was predominantly an Ulster crop; for 
example, in 1864, 84 per cent of the total flax acreage on the island was found in Ulster.27 
II
The crisis that affected Ireland in the late 1870s was both ecological and economic in origin. 
Untimely and poor weather in 1877 and 1878 led to a series of bad harvests.28 This, combined 
with the ‘grain invasion’29 – i.e., the opening of New World granaries – led to a decrease in 
both pastoral (–18.2 per cent) and tillage (–12.5 per cent) prices in the years 1876–79.30 The 
impact of both events meant that Irish agricultural producers experienced a reduction in farm 
income.
The nominal value of agricultural output fell from £48.3 million, approximately valued at 
€4.2 billion in current monetary value (hereafter current value is given in parentheses) in 1876 
to £37.2 million (€3.5 billion) in 1879.31 There are different interpretations of the magnitude of 
the impact of events when nominal values are converted to real values. According to Cullen 
the output of the main agricultural crops, measured in fixed prices, fell from £35 million (€3 
billion), in 1876 to £22.7 million (€2.1 billion) in 1879, a 35 per cent decrease.32 In contrast, 
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 33 Turner, After the Famine, p. 119.
 34 Ibid., p. 108.
 35 Kennedy and Solar, Irish agriculture.
 36 Cullen, Economic history of Ireland, p. 148.
 37 For wider discussion see Niek Koning, The failure 
of agrarian capitalism. Agrarian problems in the UK, 
Germany, the Netherlands and the USA, 1846–1919 
(1994).
 38 For example, there were numerous references 
to protection of both industry and agriculture in 
the Report from the Select Committee on Industries 
(Ireland); together with the proceedings of the commit-
tee, minutes of evidence, and appendix, H.C. 1884–85, 
(288), ix, 1.
 39 Although protectionist trade policies were 
implemented in Denmark prior to this period in rela-
tion to cheese, which Henriksen et al. argue provided 
the platform for the Danish shift to dairy farming: 
I. Henriksen, M. Lampe and P. Sharp, ‘The strange 
birth of liberal Denmark: Danish trade protection and 
the growth of the dairy industry since the mid-nine-
teenth century’, EcHR 65 (2012), pp. 770–88.
 40 I. Henriksen, M. Lampe and P. Sharp, ‘The role of 
technology and institutions for growth: Danish Cream-
eries in the late nineteenth century.’ European Rev. 
Economic Hist. 15 (2011), pp. 475–93.
 41 C. R. Fay, Cooperation at home and abroad (third 
edn, 1925), and Johnston Birchall, The international 
cooperative movement (1997).
Turner’s real volume of agricultural output index shows a decline of 23 per cent over the same 
period.33 Despite their divergence, both indices show a changing agricultural structure and 
a fall in prices; of particular note is the steep decline in pastoral prices, as pastoral goods 
comprised 75 per cent and 78 per cent of total agricultural output value in 1876 and 1879 respec-
tively in Turner’s output estimations.34 Within the pastoral sector, the largest components were 
livestock and dairy; beef prices fell by 8 per cent, but more importantly, live cattle prices fell in 
the region of 14 to 18 per cent and dairy prices fell by approximately 20 per cent.35
The economic problems facing Irish agriculture in the late 1870s were common across 
Europe. There was an increase in grain exports from new world granaries, which affected 
agricultural producers in Europe. A number of European countries responded by placing 
tariffs on grain imports, notably France and Germany.36 Other countries continued free trade 
policies. Of these, the two most important from a comparative perspective were the UK (Great 
Britain and Ireland, 1800–1921) and Denmark.37
The UK had implemented a free trade policy in agricultural produce following the repeal of 
the Corn Laws in 1846. The nation had specialized in industrial production in the nineteenth 
century and was increasingly reliant on foreign imports for its food supplies. The immediate 
beneficiaries of a free trade policy in the UK were the inhabitants of urban centres who 
required cheap supplies of food. Ireland, as a constituent member of the UK, also followed 
this free trade policy. Some voiced objections to free trade in Ireland and called for tariffs,38 
but such requests went unheeded as they went against the economic interests of the UK as 
a whole.
Denmark also continued a free trade policy in the wake of the grain invasion and implemented 
productive policies in its agricultural sector.39 Denmark had previously been a grain exporter 
to the UK but shifted into other areas of agricultural production. The Danes adopted new 
technologies, such as the centrifugal separator, and developed new methodologies, including 
cooperation, in agricultural production.40 The Danes specialized in cooperative creameries 
through which they exported high-quality standardized butter and also promoted cooperative 
pig curing stations and exported bacon of a high quality. Danish cooperative marketing and 
organization also developed in the 1880s as a response to international competition.41 
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 42 Contagious Disease (Animals) Act, 1869 (32 & 33 
Vict.), c. 70.
 43 R. Perren, ‘The North American beef and cattle 
trade with Great Britain, 1870–1914’, EcHR 24 (1971), 
pp. 430–44
 44 Poor relief can be viewed as proto-social welfare. 
Indoor relief meant that people received aid at institu-
tions, outdoor relief was aid given outside the insti-
tution. Indoor relief required the recipient to enter 
an institution whereas outdoor relief had no such 
stipulations.
 45 ‘Aggregate number relieved, continuously or suc-
cessively, during the year’, Thom’s Directory, 1888, 
p. 662.
 46 Increasing from 9.7 emigrants per 1000 population 
in 1876 to 17.6 emigrants per 1000 population in 1880.
 47 For example, in 1871 the mean percentage of 
cultivable land under potato was 19% at a national level, 
but the mean percentage of cultivatable land under 
potato crop was 27% in Connaught and 33% in Mayo: 
Agricultural Statistics of Ireland ... 1871.
 48 The mean proportion of cultivatable land was 83% 
across the island, with a standard deviation of 10%. In 
Connaught the figures were 73% and 11% respectively.
 49 Annual returns of the number of seasonal migrants 
began post-hoc in 1880 and therefore do not give us a 
good indication of the relative decline in the number of 
seasonal migrants. However, the information from the 
annual returns shows us that almost all of the seasonal 
migrants came from the west of the island, indicating 
that a decline in seasonal migration would have the 
most adverse effect there: Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘Seasonal 
migration and post-Famine adjustment in the west of 
Ireland’, in Studia Hibernica, 13 (1973), pp. 48–76.
The significance of both British and Danish actions was that Irish agricultural producers 
did not have the luxury of agricultural protection, while at the same time they were faced 
with a more productive competitor in their traditional export markets. It must be stressed 
that Irish agriculture did receive some non-tariff protection in the form of infectious disease 
control, something that hindered the importation of livestock from countries outside the UK.42 
Thus, Irish livestock exports to Britain remained relatively constant over the period and had a 
dominant share of British livestock imports.43
The impact of and response to the crisis in the late 1870s was not immediate. There was an 
increase in the number of people receiving indoor (183,979 to 368,096) and outdoor (66,116 to 
181,778) poor relief from 1876 to 1880.44 Their numbers peaked at 363,844 indoor and 226,005 
outdoor in 1881.45 There was an increase in private charity to alleviate distress. Emigration, 
which had been low in the mid-1870s, increased dramatically.46 Emigration continued to 
remain relatively high until the early-1890s. Evictions also increased in the period 1877 to 1882. 
The eviction rate rose from 9 per 10,000 farms in 1877 to 18 per 10,000 farms in 1878. This rate 
steadily increased and peaked at 99 per 10,000 farms in 1882. The increase in the eviction rate 
was partly due to changes in economic conditions that made it difficult for tenants to meet 
their obligations; it also reflected the response of landlords to the tenant agitation, which we 
discuss below. 
Conditions in the west of the island were even worse as the population there relied on 
potatoes, which were adversely affected by weather conditions.47 The adverse situation was 
compounded by the fact that the proportion of cultivatable land was lower in the west than 
elsewhere on the island.48 Perhaps more important was the loss of income experienced 
by farming households caused by a decline in the demand for seasonal labour in Britain. 
Inhabitants from the west of Ireland had migrated on an annual basis to Britain to work as 
agricultural and factory labourers.49 There were a greater proportion of marginal farms in 
the west than in other areas of the island; 82 per cent of farms were under 30 acres (12 ha.). 
Therefore, any income loss would have had a detrimental effect on the people. Conditions in 
Mayo led many landlords to offer sizeable rent abatements; however, given the small portion 
l a n d  l e agu e ,  l a n d  wa r  a n d  c o ope r at ion  i n  i r e l a n d 89
 50 Donald E. Jordan, Land and popular politics in 
Ireland: county Mayo from the Plantation to the Land 
War (1994), p. 208.
 51 The usage of the term ‘war’ is hyperbolic as there 
was no war per se, but it has become a convention to 
describe the conflict between landlords and tenants as 
a ‘land war’.
 52 Comerford, ‘Land War’.
 53 The first phase of the land war, from 1879 to 1881, 
is described as the ‘main’ phase in Comerford, ‘Land 
League’.
 54 James Loughlin, ‘Plan of Campaign’, in Connolly 
(ed.), Oxford Companion.
 55 James Loughlin, ‘New Departure’, in Connolly 
(ed.), Oxford Companion.
 56 Cullen, Economic History of Ireland, p. 149.
that rents contributed to total expenditure, these were deemed insufficient in the eyes of the 
agricultural community.50
The response to events in Ireland came in the form of social agitation which resulted in 
a ‘Land War’ (discussed below). Subsequent legislation was part of a deliberate government 
policy to pacify social agitation.
III
The Land War was a period of tenant-landlord conflict in Ireland.51 It typically refers to the 
years 1879 to 1882, though it may be said that this was one of a number of distinct phases in a 
larger land war that included the years 1886–91, 1906–1909, and some intermittent outbreaks 
of agrarian unrest until 1923.52 The focus here is on the formal organizational structure of the 
first and ‘main’53 phase (1879–81) of the Land War, the Land League, and the modus operandi 
adopted in the first and second phase (1879–81 and 1886–91). These periods involved the active 
cooperation of individual economic agents. The second phase, known as the Plan of Campaign 
(1886–91),54 is particularly worthy of note as it coincided with initial efforts to establish 
continental-style cooperatives in Ireland. Still, the Plan of Campaign was implemented on 
specific estates in the south and west of the island; therefore, it did not have the same scope 
as the agitation of 1879–82. 
Politically, the period from 1878 is also known as the ‘New Departure’,55 when there was an 
alignment of constitutional nationalism and Fenianism, republican separatism that advocated 
the use of physical force. Land reform became associated with the national question. These 
years saw the Land League play a significant role in Irish political history and witnessed the 
growth in support for the Irish Home Rule party, subsequently named the Irish Parliamentary 
Party. Charles Stewart Parnell (1846–91), a leading nationalist politician, leader of the Land 
League and himself a landlord, capitalized on agrarian discontent as well as electoral reforms 
that increased the franchise. Thus, in much of the existing historiography, land and nationalist 
politics are intrinsically linked.
(a) Land League
The incidence of crises in the late 1870s differed across the island. The protests spread as other 
sectors of the economy were adversely affected by bad weather conditions. Economic interests 
coincided and colluded to make the Land League economically and politically effective.56 The 
economic conditions were worse in the western districts. 
The first Land League meeting took place in 1879 in County Mayo (in the west of Ireland). 
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Fenian activists and local politicians became heavily involved in the agitation: they in turn 
influenced its direction. The Fenian activists were interested in land agitation as a platform for 
a nationalist movement.57 Within five months of the first meeting, a National Land League was 
established. It remained in existence until it was declared illegal in 1881. A Ladies Land League 
was established after the Land League was declared illegal, but its activities wound up in 1882.58
The Land League was a combination of tenant farmers and urban interest groups. In 
addition, a range of political figures, from Fenians to constitutionalists, together with the 
clergy, were broadly sympathetic towards the Land League. The participants had a common 
goal – to reduce rents.59 They viewed rents as a cost in agricultural production and believed 
that rent reductions would reduce their costs, increase the net income of tenant farmers and 
thus insulate them from falling agricultural prices. Urban interest groups were supportive of 
this movement as income increases would have enabled tenant farmers to repay debts and 
maintain consumption patterns. The urban argument was supported by Parnell, who argued 
that reducing rents and transferring landownership to tenants would increase ‘the buying 
power of the agricultural classes, who form nearly two thirds of the population’.60 Landlords, 
as a group, would have been adversely affected if these policies had implemented. 
The burden of rent relative to agricultural income or agricultural costs is unclear due to 
the paucity of evidence. A potential indicator of the rent burden comes late in the period, 
c.1893, from household budgets in the congested districts, relatively poorer areas in the west 
of Ireland. The burden of higher levels of rent, assuming other items of the household budget 
remained constant, at 25, 50 and 100 per cent increases over the 1893 level, have been estimated 
in Table 2 to give an indication of what higher rent levels in previous periods would have been 
relative to household costs. This crude exercise illustrates that rent relative to household costs 
varied depending on various factors. The highest proportion of rent to total costs occurred in 
what was labelled a household in ‘ordinary circumstances,’ which derived its income solely 
from agriculture. Still, these proportions varied across households. On the other side, the costs 
of obtaining rent reductions involved the possibility of eviction, loss of income and possibly 
payment to the Land League; however, the more people that participated in the action, the 
lower the costs to the individual. Reduction or elimination of rent would increase the income 
of tenant farmers, but whether the size of the increase, vis-à-vis the cost of obtaining it, 
warranted the actions involved in obtaining rent reductions, discussed below, is debatable. 
The Land League operated as a decentralized federated body. Michael Davitt (1846–1906), a 
founding member of the Land League in Mayo and a key figure in Irish nationalist politics, 
estimated that there were around 2000 branches throughout the island but that only 1000 were 
in ‘continuous active existence’.61 Davitt also claimed that the Land League had ‘half a million 
members in Ireland, branches in every town and village, and financial resources that reached 
a sum of £250,000 before the organisation was three years old’.62 By way of comparison, this 
l a n d  l e agu e ,  l a n d  wa r  a n d  c o ope r at ion  i n  i r e l a n d 91
 63 Individual cooperatives were required to pay 
 subscriptions to the IAOS, but these were not forthcom-
ing. However, individual members did contribute to 
their local cooperative when purchasing shares.
 64 R. V. Comerford, ‘The land war and the politics of 
distress, 1877–82’, in W. E. Vaughan (ed.) A new history 
of Ireland, VI: Ireland under the Union, ii, 1870–1921 
(1996), p. 36.
constituted more than the total number of cooperatives, the total number of members, and 
the amount of subscriptions and donations,63 recorded by the central cooperative agency, the 
IAOS, in the years 1894 to 1914. Like the IAOS, the League was not financially self-sustaining.64 
Although required to make subscriptions to the League, many members did not pay them, 
ta bl e  2. Rent as a percentage of estimated expenditure in Congested District Board households, 
c.1893
Type of household






I II III IV
1. Good circumstances being derived from agriculture  
and fishing
10.78 13.12 15.35 19.46
2. Very poor circumstances agriculture and fishing 13.70 16.56 19.23 24.10
3. Family in ordinary circumstances from agriculture, 
fishing and home industries
6.57 8.08 9.54 12.33
4. Family in ordinary circumstances – agriculture, 
migratory labour, and home industries
3.45 4.27 5.08 6.66
5. Ordinary circumstances – agriculture and earnings  
as migratory labourers
13.06 15.35 17.38 21.36
6. poor circumstances – agriculture and earnings as 
migratory labourers
5.74 6.69 7.53 9.33
7. Ordinary circumstances – agriculture and home 
industries
6.70 8.24 9.73 12.57
8. Ordinary circumstances – agriculture and home 
industries
7.46 9.16 10.79 13.89
9. Ordinary circumstances – agriculture and home 
industries
7.98 9.79 11.52 14.79
10. Ordinary circumstances – agriculture and home 
industries
8.77 10.73 12.60 16.13
11. Receipts and expenditure of a family in ordinary 
circumstances, the receipts being derived altogether 
from agriculture
24.03 28.34 32.18 38.75
12. Poorest possible circumstances – agriculture and labour 
in the locality
8.73 10.68 12.55 16.06
Note: the Congested Districts Boards inspectors estimated household budgets in the baseline reports, and the 
household budgets in the appendix in the first report are also estimates.
Source: Appendix in First annual report of the Congested Districts Board for Ireland, pp. 32–37. [C. 6908], 
H.C. 1893–94, lxxi, 525.
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and much of the League’s funds were raised instead in the United States by Charles Stewart 
Parnell.65 The IAOS also attempted to harness funds through this route but R. A. Anderson’s 
sojourn in the United States only reaped £1,500.66
The Land League was not solely a farmers’ movement; rather its membership covered a broad 
spectrum of rural society. In the initial Land War, large and small farmers were equally active, 
with large farmers over-represented relative to their share of the tenant population; shopkeepers, 
traders and artisans in towns were also over-represented.67 What made the League effective 
was the common goal of all its participants, despite their economic differences. 
While a picture of the regional distribution of Land League branches would enhance our 
understanding, there is no complete published list of them. Nevertheless, the number of Land 
m a p  1. Land League meetings 
per 10,000 occupied farms, 
1880
Source: Land League meetings 
and Agrarian Crime (Ireland), 
H.C. (5), 1881.
 2 < 7
 1 < 10
10 < 15
15 < 23
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League meetings provides an indication of Land League activity. Meetings were ‘one of the 
League’s principal methods of operation’; moreover, meetings often reflected the establishment 
of new branches.68 Therefore the incidence of Land League meetings in 1880, shown in Map 1 
relative to occupied landholdings, seems to be an adequate indicator of Land League activity.69 
As can be seen in Map 1 there were distinct regional patterns in Land League activity, with 
less activity present in the industrial north east and the more agricultural counties in outer 
Ulster (discussed below).70
The modus operandi of the Land League was to use combined rent strikes and social 
ostracism, commonly known as ‘boycotts’ after a cause célèbre involving Captain Boycott, to 
attain its goal of rent reduction.71 Enforcement of Land League objectives was achieved through 
informal methods such as violence, intimidation and boycotting. Michael Davitt stated in his 
speech in defence of the Land League that contrary to the views of The Times,72 the Land 
League did not advocate crime. Davitt claimed: ‘Nearly all our witnesses have testified – those 
at least who gave evidence as to speeches – that it invariably happened that the chairman or 
some speaker at every Land League meeting denounced outrage more or less, and warned the 
people against committing crime’.73 However, in the years 1879 and 1880, there was a strong 
positive correlation between Land League meetings and agrarian crime at the county level 
(0.75 and 0.73). Agrarian crime was broadly defined and there were a few incidents of murder 
or manslaughter, although these were a tiny proportion of the total figures.74 The majority of 
recorded incidents were reports of threatening letters.75
The Land League did not rely solely on negative sanctions to entice member support. There 
were a number of positive benefits; for example, the Land League provided legal support in 
the event of eviction and non-monetary support such as clothing, food and seed to members.76 
Given the fact that members did not actively contribute subscriptions and the Land League was 
financed by donations from abroad, this can be seen as a net gain to members.
The Land League was successful in that it represented the convergence of numerous interest 
groups in rural society. It was also helped by the fact that Land League agitation coincided 
with an electoral cycle – a national parliamentary election was held in 1880. The subsequent 
government response was to introduce a rent control act which reduced rents on average by 
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20 per cent, and another act paid off arrears accumulated by tenants in rent strikes.77 The 
1881 Land Act granted the three Fs, fixity of tenure (security from eviction provided rents 
were paid); free sale (the right to sell interest in a holding); and fair rent. To achieve these, 
the government established a Land Commission to mediate in landlord-tenant contractual 
disputes. The act aimed to grant the tenants a ‘fair rent’, but the policy seems to have been 
to reduce rents regardless of their level. Subsequent legislation was specifically designed to 
encourage the greater transfer of ownership from landlords to their tenants. By 1903 the Land 
Commission had been transformed into an institution that primarily supervised the sale 
of land.78
The modus operandi used by the Land League in various phases of the Land War was similar 
to the cooperative methodology used in Denmark in that economic agents cooperated with one 
another to attain economic goals and reduce costs and thereby increase income; although the 
Land League’s strategies also included boycotting and elements of traditional agrarian violence. 
In Denmark cooperative production developed on a large scale. This involved the combination 
of numerous economic agents to reduce transaction costs in agricultural production. The Irish 
response also encompassed combination and cooperation of numerous economic agents, but 
with the intention of reducing rents and enabling tenants to acquire their own landholding. 
The attraction of the Land League to many in Irish society was that it promised a reduction in 
rents and aimed to achieve owner occupancy of farms. The supporters of the Land League, it 
seems, believed that the payment of rent was the root cause of their problems. 
Why was the Land League fixated on costs and not on ways of improving productivity? In 
other words, why was the focus on the distribution of output rather than on increasing output? 
Land reform in the guise of landownership transfer from landlords to tenants occurred at 
different times in some continental countries when compared to Ireland; for example, land 
reform took place much earlier in Denmark.79 The lack of land reform may explain why 
cooperation took the forms it did in Ireland. If land reform had taken place earlier in Ireland, 
this would mean that tenants, as owner-occupiers, would have had no landlords to blame for 
their plight. Instead they would have had to focus their efforts on dealing with their immediate 
circumstances as rent would no longer have been a social grievance. Land reform would also 
have created property rights and given owner-occupiers a vested interest in partaking in 
productive reforms that would maximize returns from their property. 
(b) Agrarian agitation in Ulster
As was shown in Map 1, Ulster appears not to have seen much Land League activity in 
1880. O’Rourke used agrarian unrest to argue that Ulster did not have the same Land War 
experience and that this was an explanatory factor in the success of cooperative dairying 
in Ulster vis-à-vis the rest of the island. On casual inspection it would seem to reflect Irish 
religious and political divisions, as the north had a greater proportion of Protestants and was 
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Unionist80 in political outlook. This is supported by some sample correlations that show that 
Land League meetings were positively correlated with the proportion of Roman Catholics in 
a county and strongly negatively correlated with the proportion of Protestant confessional 
groups.81 Was there no ‘land war’ and no cooperation, as defined above, in Ulster? This 
narrative is too simplistic as it does not take into account Land League support in Ulster, the 
pre-existence of functionally equivalent institutions, or the fact that Ulster tenants were the 
first to reap the benefits of agrarian agitation.
As Kirkpatrick illustrates, a common but incorrect assumption is that land agitation was 
foreign to Ulster. The economic challenges of the 1870s also had an effect there.82 Eviction data 
shows that there was a sharp rise in the eviction rate from 3 to 25 per 10,000 holdings from 1877 
to 1880. This led to a demand for rent reductions; although a number of landlords, including 
Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery (a key figure in the constructive unionism discussed below), 
granted abatements before petitions were made.83 The north also had its own tradition of tenant 
associations that agitated for greater tenant rights, and these became the primary instigators 
for these demands.84 Although it appears that the Land League had little presence in Ulster, 
functionally equivalent tenant rights associations ‘continued to swell in numbers’.85 These 
associations were supportive of Land League goal of rent reductions but they did not share the 
Land League’s associated political affiliation to Fenianism and Home Rule. Still, efforts were 
made to establish Land League branches in the north; they were established in Tyrone and in 
southern Ulster, but were confined to counties with higher Catholic populations.86 
In the north the Protestant Orange Order initially acted in opposition to the Land 
League and held counter-demonstrations.87 Orangemen also gave direct assistance to Captain 
Boycott.88 With the Orange presence, the Ulster land agitation could easily have descended 
into a sectarian dispute; instead, broader political aims took hold and created a platform for 
ecumenical cooperation.89 Ulster, unlike the rest of the island, was not dominated by the Home 
Rule party but by the Conservative and Liberal parties, which competed for the upper-hand. Of 
the two, the Liberals adopted the cause of land reform. The Conservative party was dominant 
in the towns and boroughs, winning eight and ten seats out of a total of 11 in the 1874 and 1880 
general elections. Still, elements in the north cooperated to achieve goals of land reform and 
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rent reduction, which is reflected in the voting patterns of Catholic and Presbyterian voters 
in the rural (county) constituencies.90 In addition, there was a significant increase in voter 
cooperation to support the pro-land reform Liberal candidates. The Liberal share of rural seats 
in Ulster increased from 17 to 44 per cent between the 1874 and 1880 general elections.91 The 
association of the Liberal party with land reform transcended the sectarian arena and enabled 
pro-land reform Orangemen to align in common interest with Nationalist Land Leaguers. 
However, the political landscape post-1885 was a different prospect (discussed below) with 
a stronger division between Nationalist and Unionist political parties evident; especially in 
Ulster which became a Unionist stronghold.
Tenant farmers in Ulster supported agitation, and Orange tenants, too, supported reform. 
Thus, despite the perception that Ulster was more progressive and economically viable, Ulster 
also engaged in land agitation. Yet, Ulster tenant farmers appear to have been free-riding on 
the lobbying activities of the Land League, for when land settlements were proposed to appease 
agitation throughout the whole of the island, Ulster farmers were the first to take advantage 
of their generous terms.92
Despite common goals, why was the Land League as an institutional form not as prominent 
in Ulster? Bew argues that the most attractive feature of the Land League’s approach was the 
‘low risk of martyrdom’ and the risk was lower in the south than in the north as the implemen-
tation of boycott policies depended on the lack of local support for the landlord. Bew also 
suggests that landlords in the north were in a stronger position and thus rendered the boycott 
and similar threats less effective.93 In addition, Bew finds that the cornerstone of Land League 
rent reduction was that rents were based on land valuations (and agricultural prices), dating 
from the 1840s and ’50s. These valuations were made at a later date in Ulster and captured 
inflated flax values. Thus, while reductions of such a magnitude would have been significant 
in the south, they represented modest demands for Ulster farmers.94 Furthermore, Bew notes 
that ‘in certain periods of the Land League’s activity, supporters of quite divergent strategies 
and ultimate objectives could coexist and cooperate with each other. Differences between Irish 
revolutionaries and reformers were often obscured’.95 
IV
Slight economic recovery in the 1880s brought a respite to Irish farmers, but further ecological 
and economic shocks (droughts and recession in Britain) combined with continued price 
depression affected agricultural incomes. This in turn led to a renewal of the land agitation, 
conventionally known as the Plan of Campaign (1886–91), whereby tenants refused to pay 
rents until abatements were granted and instead deposited their rents into trust accounts.96 
This activity was primarily concentrated in the west and south of the island. The continued 
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fall in agricultural prices was a significant structural change and led protagonists to look 
further afield for methods other than rent reduction alone to cope with a dynamic economic 
environment. From the late 1880s this resulted in attempts to establish agricultural enterprises 
based on continental cooperative methodologies.
In this discussion it is important to emphasize the fact that two distinct agricultural 
innovations were being adopted in Ireland. One was technological: the centrifugal separator 
enabled the production of standardized fresh butter. The other was methodological: the 
adoption of cooperative methods to overcome information costs, reduce transaction costs and 
realize economies of scale. While the extant literature on cooperation in Ireland has primarily 
focused on cooperative creameries, this section highlights how different forms of cooperative 
enterprise were imitated and how their take-up rates varied.
The post-1885 political landscape in Ireland was essentially divided between the Irish 
Parliamentary Party and the Conservative Unionist party. The main divisive issue between the 
two parties was Home Rule, a measure of devolution for Ireland within the United Kingdom.97 
During the period 1886–1914, three home rule bills were introduced in the UK parliament; only 
the third reached the statute book, but its implementation was postponed due to the outbreak 
of the First World War.98
The Land League and Land War were generally associated with the Irish Parliamentary, 
or Home Rule, Party. Cooperative enterprises, as represented by the IAOS, were ostensibly 
apolitical and areligious; in actuality, the IAOS was associated with unionist politics. The 
IAOS was particularly associated with the policy of ‘constructive unionism’, the view that 
economic and social grievances led to support for nationalism and that redressing these 
grievances would led to a more stable political environment. This policy was sometimes called 
‘killing Home Rule with kindness’, primarily due to the association of Horace Plunkett, a 
one-time Unionist Member of Parliament, with both the cooperative movement and the 
Department of Agriculture. However, a superficial distinction of nationalist versus unionist 
is difficult to uphold when faced with local realities. Plunkett suggested that 75 per cent of 
cooperative members were in fact nationalists.99 Kennedy also highlighted the paradox of 
Irish cooperation, stating that ‘members of the nationalist party, with few exceptions, showed 
persistent hostility toward the cooperative movement, even though most farmer-cooperators 
were also nationalists’.100 Thus, although the elites of the cooperative movements may have had 
divergent political views to those associated with the Land League, the rank-and-file do not 
appear to have shared these differences. Therefore, the question is whether the link between 
political unionism and the IAOS and the corresponding link between nationalist politics and 
anti-cooperative business interests hindered the spread of cooperation in Ireland.
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(a) IAOS and agricultural cooperation in Ireland
In the late nineteenth century attempts were made by a small group of idealists to introduce 
agricultural cooperation into Ireland. Initially attempts were made to establish consumer 
cooperatives along British lines, but it was discovered that these would not take root in an 
agrarian society.101 Plunkett stated that the role of the IAOS was to ‘persuade’ people to 
adopt cooperation.102 (His involvement, an Anglo-Irish landlord and prominent Unionist 
political figure, has parallels with some continental cooperative experiences, such as Bohemia 
and Eastern Europe, whereby landlords and political figures were involved in establishing 
cooperative enterprises.) The IAOS aimed to introduce cooperative creameries on the Danish 
model, cooperative agricultural banks along German lines and cooperative agricultural stores 
of the sort found in France. However, as Plunkett himself acknowledged, the IAOS gave greater 
prioritization to the creameries. 
The first successful attempts at were a conscious effort to imitate the Danish cooperative 
creamery system. However, given the agitation between landlords and tenants in Ireland, 
Plunkett’s efforts were seen by some as promoting a landlord and Unionist agenda. Plunkett 
recounted the response of a solicitor in the town of Rathkeale, County Limerick, to an effort 
to establish a cooperative creamery in the area. The solicitor informed Plunkett that Rathkeale 
was ‘“a Nationalist town – Nationalist to the backbone – and every pound of butter made in 
this creamery must be made on Nationalist principles”’.103 
Plunkett outlined the motivation for the prioritization of creameries:
New machinery, costly but highly efficient, had enabled the factory product, notably that 
of Denmark and Sweden, to compete successfully with the home-made article, both in 
quality and cost of production … To add to the interest of the situation, capitalists had 
seized the material advantages which the abundant supply of Irish milk afforded, and the 
green pastures of the “Golden Vein” [sic] were studded with snow white creameries which 
proclaimed the transfer of this great Irish industry from the tiller of the soil to the man of 
commerce.104
This rationale supposes that cooperative creameries were encouraged not because Ireland 
had failed to adopt new technology, but because it was believed that private creameries were 
realizing ‘profits altogether out of proportion to [their] share of the capital’.105
Horace Plunkett and R. A. Anderson, another key figure in the Irish cooperative movement 
and Secretary of the IAOS, encouraged dairy farmers to establish cooperative creameries. Their 
initial focus was primarily on an area in the south west of Ireland known as the Golden Vale, 
encompassing parts of Counties Cork, Limerick and Tipperary, where there was an established 
tradition of dairy farming.106 Horace Plunkett claimed to have held over 50 meetings before 
the first cooperative creamery was established in Drumcollogher, Co. Limerick, in 1889.107 
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Coincidentally, these meetings were held in an area of the island where the second phase of 
the Land War was concentrated. 
Initially Plunkett had solicited help from the Cooperative Union, the federated body that 
represented British consumer cooperatives, for his ‘missionary work’.108 Having realized 
that consumer cooperatives looking to minimize the price paid by consumers had an 
antinomic relationship to producer cooperatives, which tried to maximize the price received 
by producers, Plunkett and his associates decided to establish their own central cooperative 
organization, the IAOS, in 1894. It is worth stressing that the apex institution representing Irish 
cooperatives at a national level was not established on a federated basis, as in other countries. 
In cooperative literature, discussion of the development of central institutions emphasizes 
individual cooperatives combining on a ‘higher level.’109 In Ireland the order was reversed 
with a central organization creating local cooperatives, representing a top-down rather than 
bottom-up approach. The role of the IAOS was outlined by Horace Plunkett as follows: ‘In the 
first instance it was to consist of philanthropic persons, but its constitution provided for the 
inclusion in its membership of the societies which had already been created and those which 
it would itself create as time went on’.110
The IAOS acted as an apex institution to a loose federation of cooperatives. In the Irish 
case, the central institution, the IAOS, propagated the idea of cooperation by organising local 
meetings and enticing people to join.111 It was a top-down social movement with the IAOS 
attempting to promote the formation of creameries. In fact, it was not until 1912 that local 
initiative formed a cooperative enterprise.112 This experience is in contrast to the Land League, 
above, where local branches formed first and then affiliated with the central institution. 
Paul-Dubois, a contemporary French observer writing in 1904, noted the role of the IAOS in 
its attempts to ‘ameliorate the condition of the agricultural population’. He noted how:
[the IAOS] of itself has created nothing; it merely organises, advises and controls. It sends out 
organisers, who undertake campaigns in one district after another, and endeavour to establish 
cooperative associations by explaining their aims, advantages and methods to the peasants. 
The subsequent role of the IAOS as the ‘parent Society’ was to monitor and supervise its 
creations and also to audit their accounts. In addition, it offered training and instruction to 
members on best practice in business, accounting lessons and legal training in cooperative law. 
As Paul-Dubois said, ‘it [the IAOS] undertakes their economic education’.113
How did these efforts compare to contemporary Danish activities? In 1892, a British Board 
of Agriculture report remarked that ‘almost all Danish agriculturists, whether the landed 
proprietor with his 300 cows, or the crofter – Huusmand – with his one or two, with like zeal 
and with equal profit, comparatively speaking, take part in the manufacture of butter’.114 The 
board attributed this growth to a ‘remarkable extension of the co-operative system’.115 This 
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sentiment cannot be applied to Ireland, where there was neither an equivalent distribution of 
dairy farming nor adoption of cooperation.
Why did the Irish not adopt cooperative methods as enthusiastically as the Danes? O’Rourke 
has explored this question by analysing a 1906 agricultural return which distinguished between 
‘proprietary and joint-stock companies’ and ‘cooperative’ creameries. His econometric analysis 
led him to the conclusion that nationalist politics and conflict undermined the ‘propensity to 
cooperate’ outside Ulster.116 O’Rourke does not explicitly state that Ulster played any special 
role; rather it was the distribution of agrarian outrages associated with the Land War which 
were detrimental to the propensity to cooperate and he finds that these ‘outrages’ were higher 
outside of Ulster. If these findings are representative, they would suggest that the Land League 
might have undermined cooperative efforts in Ireland. 
Given O’Rourke’s conclusions, it is important to assess his findings critically. O’Rourke 
focused on the ‘propensity to cooperate’ in the Irish dairy industry, and he analysed the 
proportion of cooperative creameries to all creameries at a county level in 1906. Map 2 
displays the number of creameries per occupied landholding in 1906. The first thing to 
note is the absence of creameries in nine of the counties running in a band from east to 
west, which separates the creameries in the south and the north. In 1906, 44 per cent of the 
creameries were cooperatives. The proportion of cooperative creameries was highest in the 
north, standing at 85 per cent. However, there was a greater concentration of creameries in 
the south west and Munster but, of them, only 23 per cent were cooperatives. The county 
with the highest number of cooperative creameries was Co. Tipperary, in Munster, which 
had 44 cooperative creameries; however, Tipperary also had a large ‘private’ creamery sector, 
and the proportion of cooperatives was low, at only 35 per cent. Four counties were wholly 
cooperative, Armagh (10 cooperatives), Donegal (15), Monaghan (27) and Wicklow (1), and 
three of the four were in Ulster. The numbers indicate that they had significantly lower 
numbers of both creameries and cooperative creameries than the norm. These statistical 
inconsistencies are highlighted in Table 3.117 Curiously, the early IAOS cooperative movement 
had greater support amongst Catholics in Ulster which also seems at odds with the statistical 
correlates.118 
Overall it appears as though Munster and Ulster had a similar number of cooperatives, 
but that Munster had a long-established tradition of dairy production, with networks of 
farmers, butter merchants and a butter market in Cork.119 Private creameries using centrifugal 
separators had been established in Munster before the development of cooperatives.120 In 
addition, local farmers had established their own joint-stock companies which ‘though not 
strictly co-operative, are mostly owned and worked by the milk suppliers’.121 Furthermore, 
creameries were established by both the Wholesale Cooperative Society and the Scottish 
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ta bl e  3. Creameries in 1906
Ireland Munster Ulster Connaught Leinster
Creameries 780 477 190 61 52
Cooperatives 345 112 162 45 26
Private 435 365 28 16 26
% Cooperative 44 23 85 74 50
Source: Agricultural statistics of Ireland, with a detailed report for the year 1906, H.C. [Cd. 3791], 1908, pp. 128–9.
agr ic u lt u r a l  h i s t ory  r e v i e w102
 122 Frank Porter, Porter’s guide to the manufacturers 
and shippers of Ireland (Belfast, n.d.)
 123 I. M. Henriksen, M. Hviid, and P. Sharp, ‘Law and 
peace: Contracts and the success of the Danish Dairy 
Cooperatives’, JEcH 72 (2012), pp. 197–224.
 124 I. M. Henriksen, E. McLaughlin and P. Sharp, 
‘Contracts and cooperation: the relative failure of the 
Irish dairy industry in the late nineteenth century 
reconsidered’ (European Historical Economics Society 
Working Paper, 71, 2015).
 125 This section draws on E. McLaughlin, ‘Microfi-
nance institutions in nineteenth-century Ireland’ (PhD 
thesis, National University of Ireland, 2009) and Chris-
topher L. Colvin and Eoin McLaughlin, ‘Raiffeisenism 
abroad: why did German cooperative banking fail in 
Ireland but prosper in the Netherlands?’, EcHR 67 
(2014), pp. 492–516.
 126 Plunkett, Ireland in the new century, p. 195.
 127 The mean share of creameries of all coopera-
tives registered with the IAOS in 1911 was 31 per cent; 
however, there was high variance between counties and 
the standard deviation was 28 per cent.
 128 He spent a lot of time studying Haas coopera-
tives rather than Raiffeisen cooperatives, something 
which Henry Wolff criticized him for doing: Depart-
mental committee on Agricultural credit in Ireland: 
Evidence, Appendices, and Index, q. 7153, p. 206. [Cd. 
7376], H.C. 1914, xiii, 431. 
Wholesale Society.122 Thus, without the efforts of Horace Plunkett or the IAOS to stimulate 
cooperative enterprises it is unclear whether cooperative forms of agricultural enterprises 
would have developed. Moreover, a number of high profile court cases illustrated an inability 
of Irish cooperative creameries to enforce binding contracts on their members, contracts 
which were of immense importance to Danish creameries.123 These cases suggest therefore 
that institutionally, cooperative creameries were not superior institutions in the case of 
Ireland.124 Thus, after inspection, it appears as though there were not terribly different rates of 
cooperation between the nationalist south and unionist north. This suggests that analysis of 
other cooperative enterprises might give greater insight into the development of cooperation in 
Ireland rather than the obfuscating ‘propensity to cooperate’ encapsulated in the cooperative 
share of creameries.
(b) Raiffeisenism in Ireland
The IAOS advocated the application of cooperative methods in a number of different 
situations. Initially they emphasized cooperative creameries but subsequently they promoted 
other cooperative enterprises, in particular cooperative banks.125 Plunkett claimed that he and 
the other cooperative propagators had been aware of the advantages of cooperative banks ‘but 
only in the last few years have we fully realised that they are even more required and more 
likely to do more good in Ireland than in any other country’.126 Figure 1 shows the number of 
cooperative institutions registered with the IAOS and Map 3 displays their location in 1908, 
a peak year for the registration of cooperative banks. There were regional variations in the 
form of cooperative established. In terms of the distribution of cooperative enterprises, Map 4 
displays the number of cooperative societies registered with the IAOS by county in 1911 per 
occupied landholding. There was also regional variance in the rate of cooperation throughout 
the countryside, but when all forms of cooperation are considered it can be seen that each 
county had some form of cooperative activity.127 
In 1903, H. de F. Montgomery, a unionist Ulster landlord involved in the ‘constructive 
Unionist’ policy referred to above, went on a ‘research trip’ to Germany on behalf of the 
Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction (DATI).128 In a subsequent article on 
cooperation in Germany he noted how the German system of Raiffeisenism offered ‘the best 
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model for the organisation of agricultural cooperative societies’ but that the prioritization 
of dairying in Ireland had meant that cooperative banks were not integrated with other 
cooperative businesses in Ireland.129
As was seen in Figure 1, significant emphasis was placed on establishing Raiffeisen cooperative 
banks as part of the cooperative programme in the late 1890s and early 1900s. The initial focus 
was on poor rural areas in the west of Ireland. The Raiffeisen cooperatives received government 
support, most noticeably in the form of concessional loans. However, despite this support, 
Raiffeisen societies had an ephemeral existence in Ireland. Even at their peak in 1908, shown 
in Map 5, there were a significant number of societies that were inactive and were later struck 
from the IAOS’s register. This led Rev. Cornelius Lucey (1902–82), a notable clerical figure who 
became Bishop of Cork and held a chair of philosophy and political theory at Maynooth from 
1929 to 1950130 to argue in 1943 that: 
So far no serious effort has been made to introduce Schulze-Delitzsch or Raiffeisen cooper-
atives either here or in Great Britain … There is every reason why we in Ireland should think 
seriously of inaugurating a cooperative credit movement on Raiffeisen or similar lines.131 
There were in fact a number of Raiffeisen societies still in existence at that date, but their 
f ig u r e  1. Total number and percentage distribution of cooperative societies registered with the Irish 
Agricultural Organisation Society, 1895–1922
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activities were very limited in scale. Can competition from the Land League explain their 
failure?
In an early study of cooperative banks in Ireland, Guinnane cited three key reasons for 
the failure of Raiffeisen cooperative banks in Ireland: competition for savings, an absence 
of strong auditing federations, and norms of rural behaviour that undermined information 
advantages.132 Guinnane concluded that ‘if Raiffeisen had been an Irishman, or if the Post 
Office Savings Banks [POSB] had not been established until the twentieth century, the situation 
in Ireland might have been different’.133 
Guinnane’s account of the function of the POSB is somewhat mistaken as he states that 
‘deposits and withdrawals could be made in any amount’.134 Actually, there were strict annual 
m a p  3. Cooperatives 
registered with the IAOS  
in 1908
Source: Irish Agricultural 
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limits imposed: £30 per annum between 1863 and 1892, rising to £50 per annum from 1893, 
and £200 in total.135 It was not until 1915, as a means to obtain cheaper war finance, that 
savings limits were eliminated. Joint Stock Banks (JSBs), deposit mobilizing branch banks, 
were the major incumbents in Irish rural markets and they had no limitations on deposits 
and withdrawals, accepting deposits from £1 and up.136 More importantly, the POSB did not 
issue loans whereas JSBs did. Effectively, Irish JSBs were the functional equivalent of Raiffeisen 
cooperative banks;137 whilst German JSBs did not begin branch banking until the early 
1900s. Furthermore, an important consideration is also the timing of POSB growth when it 
m a p  4. Cooperatives 
registered with the Irish 
Agricultural Organisation 
Society per 10,000 occupied 
holdings, 1911
Source: Irish Agricultural 
Organisation Society annual 
report for 1911.
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superseded TSBs, incumbent savings banks in Ireland that were primarily located in urban 
areas, as the largest savings bank on the island. This shift occurred during the land war period 
and was an intentional shift of savings to the more ‘private’ (i.e. no landlord trustees) POSB 
which had the added attraction of complete government security.138
Guinnane also argued that the Irish Raiffeisen example lacked institutional equivalents to 
German cooperative apex institutions, audit unions and central clearinghouses (centrals); of 
these two he deemed that the lack of audit unions was the more detrimental as they provided 
external management and support.139 Yet, the Irish case is an example of the political economy 
of cooperation. The IAOS had threatened to establish its own central clearinghouse in 1902.140 
m a p  5. Raiffeisen societies 
registered with the Irish 
Agricultural Organisation 
Society in 1908
Source: Irish Agricultural 
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It did so in order to force the existing JSBs, which served the function of cooperatives’ centrals 
in the Irish case, to lend to the wider cooperative movement at concessional rates of interest. 
A favourable agreement was reached in return for cooperative banks channelling all their 
deposits through JSBs.141 
Guinnane asserted that one of the reasons why Raiffeisen cooperatives failed in Ireland 
was because ‘norms of Irish society’ made it difficult to work a cooperative system.142 Using 
a statement from the 1926 banking commission, he suggests that ‘rural Irish people did not 
give “full recognition of the justice of the debt so incurred”, and thus resisted efforts to force 
repayment of loans’.143 Guinnane’s interpretation has implications for the wider history of Irish 
banking. If Irish people resisted efforts to get them to repay loans, then how could a bank 
branch network operate in rural Ireland? The truth, it seems, is that people did repay loans, so 
much so that the only thing in arrears in rural Ireland was rent.144 
Data suggest that direct competition from other financial institutions was not a critical factor 
in Raiffeisen survival. This is evident from the fact that Raiffeisen societies were located in 
remote areas. A highly significant factor was the low level of integration with other cooperative 
enterprises. Deposit mobilization was also positively related to survival. IAOS annual reports 
suggest that societies that inadvertently imitated German conditions (cooperative integration 
and deposit mobilization) survived past the 1920s.145 From an economic perspective these 
aspects of Raiffeisen societies increased information on both a potential borrower’s income and 
farming activities. Raiffeisen societies were deliberately discouraged from mobilizing savings 
and as part of bank agreements they were required to place deposits in JBSs.146 This practice 
effectively made Raiffeisen societies redundant as savings institutions. This is a reflection of 
the top-down structure of the IAOS and the fact that Raiffeisen societies were not instigated 
by local initiatives. Also, this reflects the failure of the IAOS to give any consideration to the 
functioning of rural financial markets where branch-banking JSBs were a dominant incumbent 
and functional substitute for cooperative banks.147
In terms of integration, as was shown in Map 3, there was a distribution of cooperative 
societies throughout the island with different areas having specialization in different cooperative 
enterprises. Raiffeisen societies were not integrated with the dairy cooperatives. This partially 
reflected institutional factors. Raiffeisen societies were unlimited liability whereas other 
cooperative forms were limited liability, and partly functional; other cooperative enterprises 
were able to provide credit to members.148 As the IAOS was responsible for establishing cooper-
atives the lack of cooperative integration can be attributed to IAOS policy. Furthermore, Map 3 
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suggests that O’Rourke’s findings of correlation between land war outrages and cooperative 
creameries may not translate automatically to imply a similar relationship between land war 
outrages and the cooperative movement as a whole.
The IAOS later argued that unlimited liability, a cornerstone of Raiffeisenism, was unsuitable 
to conditions in rural Ireland.149 Support for this view can be seen from the variation in land 
holdings; there was a greater proportion of small, and by definition, poorer farmers relative to 
larger, and wealthier, farmers. Unlimited liability, which implied that all members were equally 
liable for debts, deterred wealthier members from joining. Another factor, somewhat related to 
the previous, was the shortage of skilled management. This problem was compounded by the 
fact that there were no institutional equivalents of federated institutions such as Audit Unions to 
provide substitutable managerial experience. These difficulties were not experienced, however, 
by Dutch counterparts that were able to utilize confessional divisions to overcome socio-
economic encumbrances (such as those experienced in Ireland) and successfully introduce 
German-style Raiffeisen cooperative banks.150
The difficulty of attracting managerial talent was not experienced by Land League branches 
that operated in similar areas of the Irish countryside, either; for example, a Land League branch 
in Tralee, Co. Kerry had a school teacher as its president.151 Furthermore, Clark suggests that a 
broad section of social interests were involved in the Land League and that the League derived 
leadership from existing farmers’ clubs that were involved in ‘disputes between landlords and 
large farmers’.152 Again, these were features absent in credit cooperatives in Ireland as they were 
unable to attract such broad support. So why, given that both were voluntary associations,153 
was it that one form of cooperation was able to attract skilled management while the other was 
not? Kennedy argued that there was a conflict with the Catholic Church’s economic interests 
as the cooperative movement threatened rural traders on whom the church was financially 
reliant.154 This influenced priests and teachers who were reliant on clerical patronage, in turn, 
clerics were unwilling to act against their economic interests and patronage ties by supporting 
cooperative ventures that threatened the livelihoods of patrons. 
Perhaps another key element is the lack of a common mutual goal. In the Land League all 
participants stood to benefit from participation through the form of reduced rents and possible 
land transfers at concessional rates; some more than others. Hence, this could help explain 
why those with management and organizational skills would have joined the Land League – 
namely large farmers and urban interest groups. In cooperative ventures such as Raiffeisen 
cooperative societies it is not obvious that the interest of all in rural society would have been 
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homogenous. Larger farmers, a minority group, would have been burdened with the risk of 
failure if they were members of an unlimited liability cooperative bank. The interests of rural 
townsmen would have been directly impinged upon and thus could have affected those they 
patronized, such as clergy. This may explain the lack of skilled management. As Ireland did not 
develop audit unions or teaching mechanisms, it would have been difficult to find management 
substitutes.
Also, given the ephemeral nature of both the Land League and Raiffeisen cooperatives, 
perhaps members viewed each as a temporary expedient to attain instantaneous rewards 
rather than as permanent institutions. The Land League aimed to deliver reduced rents; when 
legislation was introduced that delivered this result, participants abandoned land agitation. 
In the case of Raiffeisen cooperatives they were used as a means to funnel cheap credit from 
government agencies and JSBs to members. When the sources of cheap credit were curtailed, 
active membership ceased.
In sum, the story of Raiffeisen societies in Ireland does not suggest that the Land League 
undermined cooperative banks. However, it highlights flaws in the top-down policies of the 
IAOS and friction within rural society. This, in turn with the evidence presented regarding 
cooperative creameries, does not suggest that the cooperative movement was undermined by 
the Land League but rather the IAOS attempted to imitate institutions that had no conferred 
institutional advantages compared to indigenous institutions (private creameries and JSBs). 
In this light, the fact that continental European cooperation struggled to gain a foothold in 
Ireland is not one of politics but one of economics.
V
This article has explored different forms of cooperation in late nineteenth-century Ireland. 
It argues that the Irish response to adverse exogenous shocks in the late 1870s was to adopt 
cooperative institutions. This reaction paralleled contemporaneous developments in Scandinavia. 
However, the cooperative action in Ireland was aimed at reducing one of the costs of farming – 
rent – whereas the Scandinavian and continental European forms of cooperation succeeded in 
reducing the information and transaction costs associated with agricultural production.
The ‘Land War’ inspired a social and economic mobilization similar to that required for 
a cooperative movement, but it was directed towards land reform, or rather rent reductions 
and land purchase. Horace Plunkett, the founder of the cooperative movement in Ireland, 
understood the relation between the Land League and cooperation in Ireland. He also believed 
that increased international competition necessitated the introduction of other forms of 
cooperation.155 Plunkett and others had hoped to build cooperative structures on the Land 
League tradition, but their efforts were stifled. Plunkett was initially hampered by his political 
affiliation, Unionism, as the Land League movement became associated with nationalist politics. 
In retrospect, were these different cooperative institutions competitors or complementors?
Land agitation in Ireland provided a template and infrastructure for cooperation. The 
agitators in the 1870s and ’80s would have had experience with a cooperative environment. 
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This experience could have been transferable to other cooperative ventures, provided that the 
goals of the venture were mutually acceptable. In the case of the Land War all social groups, 
excluding landlords, shared the goal of rent reduction. By contrast, cooperation in agricultural 
ventures such as agricultural stores and Raiffeisen cooperatives impinged on the interests of 
urban interest groups and patronage ties in rural society. This can explain how Land League 
branches had greater access to large farmers and urban interest groups. Thus, they were able 
to utilize their management skills, whereas cooperatives, such as Raiffeisen and agricultural 
stores, found it difficult to access skilled management. Effectively, interest groups prominent 
in the Land League were either apathetic or overtly hostile towards IAOS ventures. The Land 
League coalition of the late 1870s collapsed once its primary goals had been obtained. However, 
other factions wanted greater reforms, such as land redistribution, but such movements failed 
to galvanize interest groups as effectively as the common goal to reduce rents and achieve 
ownership transfers. 
Of the cooperative enterprises introduced by the IAOS, dairy cooperatives were the most 
successful (relatively speaking) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, 
cooperative methods did not completely dominate dairy production until later in the twentieth 
century, after the state became involved. State policy aimed to deliberately ‘make the manufac-
turing of butter entirely co-operative and place the ownership of the premises and direction 
of the industry in the hands of the farmers who supplied the raw material’.156 This led to the 
cooperative rationalization of the dairy industry under the auspices of the Dairy Disposal 
Company. In a recent study of creameries in Ireland, O’Rourke argues that areas of the country 
with a greater proportion of owner-occupiers of land in 1906 were the ones with the highest 
number of creameries;157 coincidentally, the majority of those outside the dairy heartlands in 
the south west were cooperative. This is, in effect, a legacy of the Land League and ‘Land War’, 
as the Land War provided the impetus for landownership transfers – especially in free-rider 
areas in the north.
The pertinent question then, is why Irish cooperation took a reactive stance in 1879? Perhaps 
tradition played a role as violence was a common response used to support traditional rights 
and address social grievances.158 Also, a key part of this story is the fact that land reform 
took place much later in Ireland. Therefore farmers were fixated on the issue of rents, feeling 
aggrieved at having to pay rents during severe economic downturns, rather than concerned by 
aspects of agricultural production. The IAOS believed that its role was to imitate continental 
cooperative practices but these were ideologically motivated and misguided. This implied 
cooperatives competed with established incumbents but without the perceived institutional 
advantages of the new entrants. The experience of the IAOS cooperatives illustrates the 
limitations of misguided cooperation but it does not suggest competition between the IAOS 
or the Land League. Rather, the evidence from the Land League illustrates that Irish society 
was willing to cooperate if an adequate incentive structure was in place. Perhaps an IAOS 
policy of implementing reforms in agricultural education and practice or focused reforms to 
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the dominant livestock sector, such as improvements in breeding stock, may have been more 
fruitful endeavours; in fact, key figures in the IAOS such as Plunkett were involved in the 
foundation of the DATI.
Another important question is how important was path-dependence? There was a tradition 
of violent reactions to threats to traditional privileges, such as landlord-granted rent reductions 
and tolerance of arrears. This may have influenced the pattern of reaction to the crisis in the 
late 1870s where such privileges were seen as rights by tenants.159 Possibly a more important 
factor was the tradition of state involvement in the Irish economy. As a result many looked 
to the state to provide solutions rather than taking proactive steps themselves. The state had 
previously intervened in the area of Irish land legislation and had passed an act in 1870 which 
aimed to formalize informal customary rights, thus creating expectations of state intervention. 
The Land League was effectively a cooperative lobby group that aimed to force the government 
to intervene in landlord-tenant relations on the behalf of tenants. The complaint of the 
cooperation propagators was that Irish society was more reliant on state aid than on self-help. 
George Russell, a key figure in the Irish cooperative movement, wrote that: ‘If self-help had 
been fostered as industriously as state aid we might have arrived at something’.160 Ironically, 
the cooperatives that imitated Continental forms of cooperation were also reliant on state aid. 
When the IAOS was established, despite overtures of cooperation and self-help, it was heavily 
reliant on financial subsidies from the state.161 
Finally, how does the Irish experience fit into the wider European experience? The common 
theme throughout Europe is that of institutional importation. Cooperative methodologies and 
ideals diffused beyond borders, with different areas developing cooperative methodologies at 
different stages, often at the behest of local elites. The Irish story is strikingly similar to events 
in Catalunya, as outlined by Jordi Planas. The catalyst for cooperative ventures in Catalunya 
was an exogenous shock in the form of the phylloxera plague that devastated the grape 
stock in the late nineteenth century. Changes in the economic structure influenced further 
cooperative ventures. Social divisions were also present with landowners and larger farmers 
more supportive of cooperative ventures that reflected their economic interests, as was the case 
in Ireland.162 The Netherlands successfully adopted Raiffeisen cooperative banks, which were 
integrated with other forms of cooperative enterprises.163 Also Estonia established cooperative 
banks that were integrated with other cooperative ventures, namely cooperative creameries.164 
The Irish model of dairy cooperation was based on the Danish model where cooperative 
banks were not prevalent,165 but Irish cooperative creameries were unable to enforce binding 
contracts along Danish lines.
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Political affiliations and social relations that were important factors in cooperative ventures 
in other countries were present in Ireland; however, these facets of the cooperation were initially 
more evident in the Land League than in the IAOS cooperatives. For example, in Bohemia 
and Eastern Europe, local political elites were present in traditional forms of cooperative 
ventures.166 In Ireland local political elites were more pronounced in the Land League than in 
IAOS cooperatives. It was not until the 1900s that the cooperatives began to take on political 
affiliations. For example, nationalist diary cooperatives were a response to private creameries 
that ‘symbolis[ed] colonial trading links as well as English (Protestant) ownership of the means 
of production’ in County Tipperary;167 whereas the Land League adopted political affiliation 
from the outset. This culminated in reprisal attacks on cooperative creameries by British 
auxiliary forces during the Irish War of Independence (1919–21).168 Overall though, Irish 
developments in cooperation may be seen to parallel events further afield. 
